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For program administration and for policy purposes, savings data are fundamental to the 
Children and Youth Savings Account Policy Demonstration (CYSAPD).  Whether or not the 
researchers also need the data, programs must track how much each participant has saved and 
how much is to be disbursed in matching funds.   
 
Of particular relevance for the administration and evaluation of the American Dream 
Demonstration (ADD) of Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) was the development of 
MIS IDA, a management information system designed by the Center for Social Development.  
Yet, for CYSAPD, a tracking system other than MIS IDA may be the best choice.  ADD 
suggests that programs sometimes have difficulty tracking savings data, and another system may 
(1) be easier for programs to run (because they will be responsible for less tracking); (2) show 
how a program could be run by institutions capable of running a national policy.   This paper 
contrasts the differences between ADD and the proposal for CYSAPD regarding savings 




ADD assumes that most deposits in IDAs come from the adult participants themselves.  In 
CYSAPD, a much larger share of deposits—especially for children—are likely to come from 
someone other than the child or youth, for example parents, grandparents, or third parties such as 
501(c)(3) organizations.   
 
The third-party distinction matters because the participant does not control the presence or access 
of such contributions.  Just as in ADD, some programs had higher match rates than others simply 
because they were more successful in raising funds.   
 
In ADD, third-party contributions are used to match the savings of participants.  Match dollars 
are always kept separate from the participant deposits.  In effect, the participant has two 
accounts.  The participant establishes one account, and—using MIS IDA—the sponsoring 
organization tracks separately third-party match dollars (held in a single account) for each 
participant.  The sponsoring organization provides match dollars to the approved vendor at the 
time of asset purchase.   
 
In CYSAPD, as in ADD, the research focuses on the savings behavior of the participant and 
his/her family, independent of whatever third parties happen to do.  Thus, to optimize the lessons 
learned for CYSAPD policy and research, contributions related to the participant (the child or 
youth, parents, or grandparents) must be tracked separately from third party contributions.  
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An essential topic for CYSAPD is the incentive structure.  It has been suggested that an 
alternative to the incentive used in ADD may be more useful for CYSAPD participants and also 
provide a better fit for to-scale policy implementation.  In CYSAPD, there are two possible third-
party incentive structures:  match and additive.  
 
The match incentive is demonstrated in ADD.  For example, for every x dollars the participant 
saves, a match of $y multiplied by $x is contributed.  The match rate may vary among programs 
in ADD, but the typical rate is 2:1.   
 
ADD’s incentive structure matches the balance of the participant’s account within any given 
statement period (as opposed to matching the deposits in a given period).  In addition, there are 
calculations to limit matching based on time caps and dollar maximums.  
 
An additive incentive is a fixed dollar amount that may or may not be related to saving.  For 
example, an achievement-based additive incentive may be tied to graduation from high school, a 
specific grade-point average, or honor-roll attainment.  On the other hand, the additive incentive 
may be savings-based.  For example, a participant may receive a third-party fixed contribution 
for enrolling in CYSAPD via an automatic deposit program.  By electing to automatically 
deposit contributions, the participant has made a financial commitment to monthly saving.  
Research indicates that a participant is less likely to drop out of an IDA program if savings are 
deposited automatically (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2001; Schreiner et al., 2001).  Another example 
of an additive incentive may be the receipt of a third-party contribution based on net savings 
during a given year (ie. if the participant’s end of year balance is $x or greater, then $y is 
deposited).   
 
For CYSAPD, sponsoring organizations may either design their programs to provide match or 
additive incentives for the benefit of the participant.  However, the simplest, and therefore 
recommended incentive is additive.  CYSAPD programs may be more likely to use additive 
incentives for the following reasons:  (1) youth have little money of their own to deposit, and an 
additive incentive may not be dependent on such contributions; (2) school-based performance 
may be emphasized, tying contributions to achievements; (3) match calculations are not 
necessary, simplifying the account management; thus, additive incentives may be easier to 
operate on a national scale. 
 
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
  
Fundamental to the success of CYSAPD is the selection and use of a simple and effective 
standardized management system.  The choice of a system will be dictated by program and 
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One possible goal for CYSAPD is to pilot a program that can go to scale.  From this perspective, 
program design should be compatible with current systems that can support nationwide 
participation, such as 401(k) plans.  Current possibilities for to-scale systems include a system in 
development, Doorways to Dreams (D2D), or a college savings-plan system. 
 
D2D OnLine IDA.  Developed by the Harvard Business School in partnership with D2D Fund 
and SunGard, D2D is a prototype modified 401k system designed to handle account management 
for IDAs (Johnson et al., 2001).  However, D2D is still in the design phase and it is questionable 
whether it will be available and tested for CYSAPD sites across the country by the start of this 
demonstration.  At this time, it does not appear that D2D is a viable option for CYSAPD.   
Thus, the CYSAPD management information system options are: 
Option 
College saving-plan 
accounting MIS IDA 
1    
2     
 
College savings-plan accounting systems.   A college savings plan is an investment plan 
operated by a state designed to help families save for future post-secondary education costs.  A 
professional money manager, such as TIAA-CREF or Fidelity Investments, typically provides a 
centralized accounting system for each state’s program.  Clancy (2001) discusses college savings 
plans in detail and presents the implications for CYSAPD.   
 
If the focus of CYSAPD is on parents saving for a child’s education, and for teens interested in 
saving for post-secondary education, then college saving plans are recommended as the saving 
vehicle (Option 1).  In this case, a separate system—such as MIS IDA—will not be required of 
the sponsoring organizations for tracking savings data (Clancy, 2001); however, a 
companion system will be necessary to collect demographic characteristics.  An 
additiveincentive structure may be best suited for college savings plans. 
 
Option 1 supports saving only for post-secondary education.  A second option is to use both 
college savings plans and a system that can accommodate other approved saving uses, such as 
MIS IDA.  It may be impractical for a single site to operate two separate systems; therefore, the 
experimental sites could use college savings plans and all other sites could use either MIS IDA 
or college savings plans to track savings information in CYSAPD.   
 
MIS IDA.  While MIS IDA provides flexibility for tracking a variety of intended uses, the 
system is not capable of demonstrating scale (Johnson et al., 2001).  Furthermore, the use of MIS 
IDA by CYSAPD may depend on the saving incentive structure selected.  The current MIS IDA 
accounting function is a match, not an additive, incentive structure.   
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MIS IDA may be revised to accommodate an additive incentive structure, and will also require 
revisions to track participant characteristics tailored to CYSAPD (Clancy, Johnson & Schreiner, 




How will savings data be collected and what will be the incentive structure for CYSAPD?  The 
response to this question may influence the amount of effort organizations spend collecting data, 
and may also impact the selection of the appropriate monitoring system.  Two systems options 
are proposed.   The recommended model for scale is college savings plans; the system is 
currently available nationwide and account management is handled by the college savings plan 
money manager.  Discussion regarding demonstration goals, incentive structures, and approved 
uses of accounts will determine the selection of an appropriate system for CYSAPD. 
                                                           
1  A modified version of MIS IDA may be used to only collect demographic information at all sites. 
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